The Rise of the Dark Fleet
How shadow tankers are reshaping global trade
In recent years, a growing portion of global maritime activity has slipped into the shadows, operating beyond traditional monitoring and regulatory frameworks. Known as the “dark fleet”, this network of vessels disables tracking systems, obscures ownership, and often moves sanctioned goods such as Iranian, Venezuelan, or Russian oil. As geopolitical tensions and sanctions intensify, the size and sophistication of the dark fleet have surged, raising concerns across security, environmental, and economic domains.
The term “dark fleet” refers to ships that deliberately turn off their AIS (Automatic Identification System) transponders, rendering them invisible to global tracking systems. While brief AIS shutdowns can be legal in certain navigational zones, routine or strategic disabling is typically a red flag. These vessels often engage in deceptive shipping practices: frequent flag changes, ship-to-ship transfers in remote areas, and ownership structures hidden behind layers of offshore entities.
Much of the dark fleet's expansion has been driven by efforts to circumvent Western sanctions, especially on Russian crude following the invasion of Ukraine. With price caps and export restrictions in place, Russia has increasingly relied on a network of aging tankers, many sold off by Western owners and now operated under questionable flags with little regulatory oversight. A similar pattern has played out for sanctioned oil from Iran and Venezuela.
A major risk associated with the dark fleet is safety and environmental negligence. These vessels are often older than 20 years, poorly maintained, uninsured, and noncompliant with international safety protocols. A few incidents — including oil spills, onboard fires, and mechanical failures — have occurred in recent years involving shadow fleet ships, raising alarm among regulators and maritime safety authorities.
From a financial standpoint, the dark fleet undermines market integrity. It distorts shipping rates, creates unfair competition, and exposes insurers, banks, and logistics providers to compliance risks. Many of these ships operate in legal gray zones, and sometimes through deliberate deception, making it difficult for legitimate actors to assess counterparties and avoid entanglement in sanctions violations.
I can understand when some people argue that the dark fleet reflects an “unregulated” or “pure market capitalism,” but the reality is not that simple. It is not a free market in the classical sense. Instead, it is a shadow economy that exists because of government intervention — namely sanctions — but operates by exploiting gaps in international enforcement, not through open competition or price discovery.
A true free market depends on transparency, rule of law, and equal access. Bitcoin is like that, at least for now. But the dark fleet thrives on opacity — hidden deals, false paperwork, and weak oversight.
One proposed — and unconventional — solution would be for the U.S. or its allies to buy dark fleet vessels, particularly those involved in transporting sanctioned goods, to shrink capacity and mitigate safety and compliance risks.
There are clear advantages: it could immediately reduce the number of unsafe, high-risk ships at sea; raise logistical hurdles for sanctions evaders; and demonstrate regulatory intent. But there are also downsides: the ships are replaceable, ownership is difficult to trace, and such a move could create perverse incentives — encouraging future noncompliance in hopes of a government buyout.
Ultimately, this kind of intervention might make sense as a tactical move within a broader enforcement strategy — but on its own, it cannot resolve the deeper structural issues that make the dark fleet profitable in the first place.
Even if tactically effective, buying back ships would need to be part of a coordinated, multi-layered strategy. Regulators and intelligence firms are increasingly employing AI tools, sanctions screening, and satellite imagery to track and expose suspicious activity. Meanwhile, legal pressure is mounting on facilitators: insurers, port operators, financial institutions, and flag registries.
The dark fleet is not just a shipping issue — it’s a reflection of government intervention and economic pressure. While it may never disappear entirely, its influence might be sharply curtailed through stronger transparency standards, cross-border regulatory cooperation, and targeted, well-enforced interventions – which, for good or for worse (and I have my opinion), is coming.